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THE NASA LUNAR ENERGy _NTERPRISE CASE STUDY TASK FORCE
EXECUTIg_E SUMMARY
Thee Lunar Energy Enterprise Case Study Task Force was asked
by NASA to determine the economic viability and commercial busi-
ness potential of mining and extracting He- 3 from the lunar soil,
and transporting the material to Earth for use in a fusion
reactor to generate electricity. While the Task Force concen-
trated its efforts on the He- 3 concepts, two other space energy
projects, the Space Power Station (SPS) and the Lunar Powe_ Sta-
tion (LPS), were also reviewed because of several interrelated
aspects of these projects, such as the use of lunar material, the
possibility of manufacturing some elements of the project systems
on the Moon, and the need of all three projects for space trans-
portation and space station requirements, in varying degrees.
Additionally, the SPS and LPS projects have the capability of
providing energy for lunar-based activities.
In carrying out its assignment, the Task Force considered:
i.
.
The legal and liability aspects of the He- 3 and other
space energy projects.
The long-range need for electricity and the energy op-
tions to meet these requirements.
I
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Executive Summary
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o
The state of knowledge of the He- 3 and other space
energy projects and the time frame for their develop-
ment.
The commercial potential of the He- 3 and other space
energy projects, and the role industry might be willing
to play in their development and use.
The information made available to the Task Force by NASA and
other sources suggested no inhibiting legal and liability factors
which would prevent the use of Moon resources for the space en-
ergy projects. But further study is recommended. While the Task
Force did not develop any long-range global electricity fore-
casts, and while such long-range judgments are difficult to make
with a high degree of accuracy, there appears to be general
agreement that the use of electricity will continue to increase,
particularly in developing countries if they are to raise the
standard of living of their citizens. Thus the need to examine
long-range electricity options is essential. Most electricity
growth will be met in the next several decades by utilizing cur-
rent technology and terrestrial fuel resources, particularly in
developing nations. But long-term, there could be limitations in
the use of our current means of producing electricity, as emerg-
ing environmental concerns and resource availability suggest a
changing character to the energy policy decisions that must be
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made in the future. Environmental concerns have momentum, and,
if nothing else, they have the potential to increase the real
costs of producing electricity with the use of fossil fuels as
resources become more expensive to produce (particularly oil and
gas) and the capital cost of the facilities to burn fossil fuels
(particularly coal) in an increasingly strict environmentally
acceptable manner becomes more expensive. These cost factors
make serious consideration of extraterrestrial energy options a
matter of national interest. Synergism with future space policy
directions may also be a factor that would influence future en-
ergy supply choices. Long-term global ecological concerns cannot
be quantified nor can the long-term production costs of current,
or as yet developed energy options, but it is, nevertheless, im-
portant to have these additional options. The Moon can provide
these. All three options considered in this Report (He- 3, LPS
and SPS) have the potential promise to provide a practically in-
exhaustible, clean source of electricity for the U.S. and world-
wide, without major adverse impacts on the Earth's environment.
Total industry responsibility for pursuing any of the three
extraterrestrial energy concepts considered in the Report is not
De___ble at this time because the risk is high; the payout period
is long; technological feasibility is not fully developed, and
thus requires considerable R&D investment; and near-term energy
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investments are more attractive. Pursuit of these energy coD-
cepts requires the combined efforts of government and industry.
Indeed, total and sole government responsibility would inhibit
progress. Innovative forms of government and industry cooper-
ation must be developed and implemented over the next several
decades. The Report describes one such innovative approach.
There are probably others which further detailed analyses by fi-
nancial experts might suggest. The arrangement outlined in the
Report is based on the conviction that the commercial development
of extraterrestrial energy arid the development of a lunar base
can be linked effectively. The lunar base can serve a_ a devel-
opment step of many of the technologies needed for the energy
system, and can be a customer for services at pilot production
levels.
The Moon must play a role in long-term terrestrial elec-
tricity supply matters. Early commercial involvement in this
task is of paramount importance in achieving this objective and a
meaningful leadership role for industry is potentially possible.
But total industry responsibility for projects of this financial
magnitude is not initially possible and government involvement
through subsidies or other means, such as co-funding or enabling
contracts, is vital. The mining of He- 3 for transportation to
Earth is a potentially viable, economic concept but understandbly
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on a long-range schedule and subject to government/industry
cooperative arrangements outlined in the Report. The two solar
power concepts likewise could have long-range economic potential
as extraterrestrial electric power sources but the three concepts
were not rated in terms of potential economic viability, although
it is evident that each concept has both promise and problems.
The factual case for the Report's findings needs further
development. NASA and DOE should continue to support studies
that will better frame the development of the projects and pro-
vide the additional technical, economic and financial information
that will be necessary for greater commitments. These studies,
however, should not be contracted for under normal government
procedures. Industry should be given a primary role in planning
the overall program, perhaps through the establishment of a high-
level private sector advisory committee. High-level represen-
tatives of the Administration, appropriate government agencies
such as DOE, EPA and NASA, the energy, environment and space
leadership of the Congress, electric utilities, the space and
energy supply industries, and the financial community must con-
sider looking beyond Earth for our long-term electricity needs
because of potential damaging ecological impacts with continual
major dependence on fossil fuels for terrestrial energy needs.
This is a revolutionary concept, and is based on a crucial
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observation regarding long-term environmental consequences of our
current energy production options. There must be understanding,
agreement and long-term commitment, and the national will to im-
plement the commitment as a matter of national policy.
Lastly, we must recognize that other nations, notably Japan,
West Germany and Russia, are proceeding with very aggressive pro-
grams to investigate and develop space-oriented, energy systems.
It will be done. It is just a matter of by whom.
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REPORT OF
THE NASA LUNAR ENERGY ENTERPRISE CASE STUDY TASK FORCE
BACKGROUND
The Lunar Energy Enterprise Case Study Task Force (the Task
Force), a group of professionals with diverse backgrounds and re-
sponsibilities (membership list attached as Appendix A), was
asked by NASA to determine the economic viability and commercial
business potential of mining and extracting He- 3 from the lunar
soil, and transporting the material to Earth for use in a fusion
reactor to generate electricity. In order to bring perspective
to the study, two other extraterrestrial electric energy produc-
tion projects were considered as "straw men". One was to collect
and convert solar energy into electricity and beam it to Earth
from a space power station (SPS) and the other from the Moon, a
lunar power station (LPS).
While the Task Force concentrated its efforts, in accordance
with its NASA charter, on the He- 3 concepts, the other two
projects were also reviewed because of several interrelated as-
pects of the projects, such as the use of lunar material, the
possibility of manufacturing some elements of the project systems
On the Moon, and the need of all three projects for space trans-
portation and space station requirements, in varying degrees.
Additionally, the SPS and LPS projects have the capability of
providing energy for lunar-based activities.
DISCUSSION
The Task Force has met five (5) times to carry out its re-
sponsibilities. In addition, various subgroups of the Task Force
have met to consider detailed technical or financial issues.
During the course of its study, the Task Force has considered:
Io
.
.
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Legal/Liability Aspects -- can we conform to legal re-
quirements and utilize the Moon in the manner contem-
plated (i.e., can the laws be adapted to facilitate use
of the Moon for an enterprise)? What about compensation
for damages? Who will bear the risk?
Long-range Need for Electricity -- is there a market for
the projects' output?
Long-range Electric Generation Options and their Envi-
ronmental Impact -- can the He- 3 fusion concept com-
pete? Is it or the other extraterrestrial concepts more
compatible with the environment than current terrestrial
electric power production facilities?
State of Knowledge -- what do we know? What remains to
be done? What about costs, etc.?
Time Frame of Development -- when might the He- 3 fusion
concept or the other extraterrestrial concepts be
capable of reliable performance? How do they, or can
they, tie into other NASA programs or objectives?
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. Commercial Potential -- what role would industry be
willing to take in the extraterrestrial projects, under
what circumstances and when?
Given the limited resources of the Task Force, time con-
straints and a charge to investigate only whether further de-
tailed study, presumably with adequate resources, should be
undertaken, the Task Force in many instances was capable of ren-
dering only qualitative judgments. It has, however, collected or
developed significant technical information. The highlights of
these data are attached as Appendices B-I, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5,
and B-6 to this Report.
Legal/Liability Aspects - The NASA staff provided the Task
Force with a brief verbal report on the legal aspects of a U.S.
entity utilizing the Moon for the production of electricity for
terrestrial purposes, with a conclusion that it would be possible
to do so in a manner that would meet international treaty intents
regarding "Benefits to All Mankind". Some members of the Task
Force, however, believe that obtaining title to lunar real estate
might be necessary to attract venture capital for lunar enter-
prise projects.
A February 1989 report by the Wisconsin Center for Space
Automation and Robotics for the NASA Office of Commercialization
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reviewed the He- 3 concept and concluded that an acceptable basis
can be found for cooperative international production of lunar
He-3, should the U.S. decide to do so.
Space treaties also address liability aspects of the projects
being considered, specifically stating that government indemnifi-
cation would be available to cover commercial projects.
The information available to the Task Force, and the exper-
tise of certain members of the Task Force suggest that the legal
issue does not appear to be a "show stopper". Nevertheless, fur-
ther independent study should be undertaken.
Long-Range Electricity Needs - Fully supportable, long-range
projections of electricity use (25 to 50 years), particularly on
an international basis, are difficult to make. Nevertheless,
some observations about the future use of electricity can be made
with a high degree of confidence. From 1972 to 1988, U.S. energy
use rose by less than seven percent, but electricity use grew by
55 percent. It is expected that in the U.S., electricity will
continue to be the energy of choice for end-use purposes and its
use, relative to other energy sources for end-use purposes,
should continue to increase. Based on an extensive review of
economic, societal and technological trends, the Edison Electric
Institute* recently issued a report entitled, Electricity
The Edison Electric Institute is the national association of
the investor-owned electric utility industry.
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Futures - America's Economic Imperative, which projects that the
total U.S. electricity consumption will grow by 2.6 percent annu-
ally until the Year 2000, and then by 1.5 percent annually in the
15-year period 2000 to 2015.
In order to increase and sustain economic growth, even
greater electricity growth rates must be achieved by developing
countries. A 1988 report of the Working Group on Long-Term Fore-
casting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) estimated that electricity projections for the OECD
regions (North America, Western Eurcpe and the Industrialized
Pacific) would double during the period 1985-2030, while there
would be an eight-fold increase in projected electricity usage in
the developing countries during the same period. Conservation
may work "wonders" in societies where waste exists, but does not
solve the energy production needs of the majority of mankind.
Long-Range Electricity Supply Q})tions - Most electricity
growth will be met in the next severa: decades by utilizing cur-
rent technology and terrestrial fuel resources, particularly in
developing nations. For the most part, these will be provided by
coal and nuclear fission. But long-term, there could be limita-
tions in the use of our current means of producing electricity.
It is beyond the scope of this report to quantify these limita-
tions and when they might influence energy policy at both the
national and international levels. Sut emerging environmental
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concerns and resource availability suggest a changing character
to the energy policy decisions that must be made in the future.
For example, Western European per capita energy consumption ap-
plied worldwide would lead to the inane energy consumption of
40,000 million metric tons of coal equivalent per year!* And
yet, economic aspirations require increased energy availability
particularly to poor countries. Forests are a poor and limited
source to meet such needs. And their use as combustible fuels
would add to, not decrease, environmental impacts.
We have already seen environmental issues raised to a global
level with concerns about global climate change. One of the so-
lutions suggested to mitigate global warming is a reduction in
the use of fossil fuels to decrease CO2 emissions by 20 percent
as early as the Year 2000. Only time will tell how urgent is the
problem and how Draconian will be the solutions. But the global
environmental concerns have momentum, and, if nothing else, they
have the potential to increase the real costs of producing elec-
tricity with the use of fossil fuels as resources become more ex-
pensive to produce (particularly oil and gas) and the capital
cost of the facilities to burn fossil fuels (particularly coal)
in an increasingly strict environmentally acceptable manner be-
comes more expensive.
According to the 1986 Energy Statistic Yearbook of the United
Nations, world consumption of energy in 1986 was 9322 million
metric tons of coal equivalent.
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Currently, in the United States, nuclear fission is not con-
sidered a near-term, viable electricity option for new capacity
for several reasons which need not be discussed in this Report.
And, although it is, and will continue to be, a viable option in
other nations, and, although many believe it will, and should, be
a revitalized option in the United States in the near-term fu-
ture, there is the possibility in the longer-term future that
thermal pollution, nuclear proliferation and nuclear waste con-
cerns will continue to impact adversely on its use.
Any development of long-term (25 to 50 years) scenarios of
international energy production and use is fraught with problems.
It is very difficult to suggest that fossil fuels, and more re-
cently, nuclear fuels, which have served us well and in which
governments and industry have huge investments, should not re-
main, along with conservation and end-use efficiency, the corner-
stone of our near-term energy future. The long-term is not so
clear.
The only apparent choice with today's technology is coal and
nuclear fission power. They will and should be used. Also to be
_ens_4ered is the D-T fusion reactor and Earth-based solar power.
But these energy options have drawbacks. The D'T reaction re-
sults in radioactivity and Earth-based solar power is limited to
cloud free daylight hours of operation. Consequently, it is im-
portant to have additional options. The Moon can provide these.
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All three options considered in this Report (He- 3, LPS and SPS)
have the potential promise to provide a practically inexhausti-
ble, clean source of electricity for the U.S. and worldwide,
without major adverse impacts on the Earth's environment.
Deep and growing concerns regarding environmental pollution,
thermal limits, potential fuel scarcity, and the non-uniform
international distribution of fossil resources suggest cost fac-
tors that will influence future directions, and make serious con-
sideration of extraterrestrial energy options a matter of na-
tional interest. Synergism with future space policy directions
may also be a factor that would influence future energy supply
choices.
_xtraterrestrial Electricity Supply Options -As stated in
the background section to this report, NASA requested the Lunar
Enterprise Case Study Task Force to assess the economic viability
of mining and burning lunar He- 3 to produce terrestrial elec-
tric power. In order to provide perspective to the assessment,
the Task Force was requested to consider two other extraterres-
trial electric energy production projects, the solar power satel-
lite (SPS) and the lunar power system (LPS). What follows are
brief technical descriptions of the three concepts. More de-
tailed information about the concepts is provided in appendices
B-I to B-4. Appendix B-5 provides additional information on the
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space transportation requirements and operations aspects of space
energy systems. Appendix B-6 provides additional information on
the He- 3 concept.
Helium-3 System Co_c%pt
According to plans prepared before a source of He- 3 was
discovered, the first fusion reactors will be fueled by two iso-
topes of hydrogen, deuterium (D) and tritium (T), to produce
energy, neutrons and helium. One of the drawbacks of this pro-
cess will be the radioactivity which accompanies the neutrons and
tritium, orders of magnitude less than from fission reactors, but
undesirable nevertheless.
He- 3 combines with deuterium in an alternate fusion reac-
tion. This reaction produces fewer and lower energy neutrons and
almost no tritium but as much energy as the D-T reaction. Be-
sides generating critical reaction energy and reduced radio-
activity, the D-He- 3 reaction could ease the development, li-
censing, and maintenance of fusion reactors. The D-He- 3 fusion
process produces charged particles. This holds the potential for
a large increase in the conversion efficiency to electric power
by avoiding the step of thermal conversion. However, compared to
the D.T reactor, the D-He- 3 reactor may be larger and will
operate at a temperature three times as high.
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Fusion of He- 3 has received little emphasis in the Depart-
ment of Energy development programs because not enough He- 3 was
available on Earth to support a commercial reactor. Research and
demonstration reactors are feasible with the terrestrial He- 3
supply, and the Joint European Tokamak research reactor has al-
ready produced I00 KWof D-He- 3 thermonuclear power. However, in
the early 70's, lunar scientists noted that a large quantity of
He- 3 had been implanted by the solar wind in the lunar soil and
that this He- 3 could be used as a fusion fuel. It has been
estimated that 25 tonnes of He- 3, reacted with D2, would have
provided for the entire U.S. energy consumption in 1987.
Although lunar He- 3 is not renewable, it is estimated that there
is sufficient He- 3 on the surface of the Moon to satisfy the
world's current electric energy needs for over a i000 years.
Thus, the He- 3 concept, shown in Figure i, involves going to the
Moon to separate the He- 3 from the lunar soil, and return it to
Earth for use as a fuel in specially designed commercial fusion
electric power plants.
To achieve this goal, will require large-scale lunar mining,
soil processing, and separation of He- 3 from other released
volatiles, transportation of this helium to Earth, and
development of the D-He- 3 fusion reactor. Definition of each of
these steps has been initiated. A lunar miner which returns soil
to the trench after removing volatile substances, including
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He- 3, is in a preliminary conceptual design stage. Separation of
He- 3 from other gases could use available technologies. Volatile
by-products, such as hydrogen, oxygen, water, and nitrogen, in
quantities much larger than that of He- 3, will be produced.
Important space applications may exist for these materials.
Concepts for transporting the He- 3 to Earth and for fusion
reactors to burn it are also being studied.
He- 3 could sell on Earth for a half million dollars per
pound, according to preliminary benefit analyses. This could
make He- 3 an ideal space product worth the expense of the
mission. In addition, the accumulation of volatile by-products
on the Moon could be worth as much, financially, as production of
He- 3. Thus, in a preliminary sense, the He- 3 concept appears to
have great economic potential.
The Sol_r PQwer Satellite CSPS) Concept
The objective of the SPS is to convert solar energy in space
for use on Earth. Its most significant benefit is the potential
for continuously generating large-scale electric power for dis-
tribution on a global basis. The SPS concept is shown schemati-
cally in Figure 2.
An SPS system would consist of many satellites in geosyn-
chronous Earth orbit, each SPS beaming power to one or more re-
ceiving antennas at desired locations. The system, as studied
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by NASA and DOE in the 1970's, provided 5000 Mw of electric power
to the Earth from a single satellite. Use of modern structural
techniques in a 1990's design would substantially reduce the mass
and further enhance SPS feasibility.
Solar radiation received in geosynchronous orbit is available
24 hours a day most of the year. With this year-round power ca-
pability, SPS could be used to generate base load power on Earth
with a minimum requirement for energy storage.
Microwave beams, or laser beams, would be used to transmit
the power generated by the SPS to receivers on Earth. With
microwave power transmission, for example, generators are in-
corporated in the transmitting antenna, which is designed as a
circular, planer, active, slotted, phased array. To provide
microwave power from geosynchronous orbit, the transmitting an-
tenna would be about 1 kilometer in diameter, and the receiving
rectenna on Earth would be about i0 by 13 kilometers, at 40 de-
grees latitude. The microwave receiving and converting antenna
(rectenna) has already been demonstrated to convert a microwave
beam into direct current electricity with an efficiency of 85
percent.
To be commercially competitive, the SPS will require a space
transportation system capable of placing payloads into low orbit
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and geosynchronous orbit at substantial lower cost than possible
today. This will require an advanced launch system similar to
several now being considered. If SPS power could be supplied on
a small scale to evolving space projects, such as Space Station
Freedom, overall SPS feasibility may be enhanced.
From a technology viewpoint, SPS does not require a return to
the Moon; however, SPS would benefit economically from the estab-
lishment of a lunar base and the development of processing tech-
nologies for lunar materials. Transportation of all the required
materials from Earth on a scale required to build up a global SPS
system may result in environmental damage from propulsion by-
products. Since less energy is required to move mass from the
lunar surface to geosynchronous Earth orbit than from the Earth's
surface to the same orbit, it will be advantageous -- potentially
even mandatory for economic feasibility -- to obtain materials
for the construction of the SPS from the Moon. If processing and
the transportation of materials from the Moon to geosynchronous
orbit could be accomplished at costs comparable to the launches
of payload from Earth, conceivably, more than 90 percent of the
mass of an SPS could be mined, refined, fabricated, and trans-
[crtcd from the Moon.
In summary, lunar resources, such as metals, glasses, and
oxygen, promise to provide materials for the construction of the
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system of solar-powered satellites in geosynchronous orbit pro-
vided that the use of these resources can be competitive with
terrestrial materials. Also, through the SPS reference system
study of the 1970's, it has been demonstrated that the technology
for transmitting power from space to Earth is amenable to evolu-
tionary development and that the SPS concept is technically
feasible. If placed near the Moon, an SPS could provide power to
a lunar base as a first, important technology demonstration proj-
ect of far-reaching importance.
Lunar Power _ystem Conc@pt
The lunar power system (LPS) is a microwave power-beaming
concept which uses the Moon rather than Earth-orbiting satellites
for collecting and transmitting power. The elements of this sys-
tem can be understood from Figure 3. The LPS will collect solar
energy at lunar power bases located on opposing limbs of the
Moon. Each base contains solar converters and microwave trans-
mitters that transform the solar power into microwave power.
This is beamed to receivers on Earth and in space, which convert
the microwaves back to electric power. Most of the components of
the base will be formed from lunar materials. Initial estimates
suggest that only one tenth of a tonne of components and consum-
ables will be required from Earth to implace one megawatt of re-
ceived power.
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To use a lunar power base during lunar night, additional sun-
light will be reflected to the base by mirrors in orbit about the
Moon. Microwave reflectors in mid-altitude, high inclination or-
bits about the Earth, will redirect microwave beams to rectennas
that cannot directly view the Moon. The sunlight and microwave
reflectors can eliminate the need for power storage on the Moon
or Earth, permit the LPS to follow the power needs of each re-
ceiver, and minimize the need for long-distance power transmis-
sion lines on Earth. The complete lunar power system consists of
the power bases, the orbital mirrors around the Earth and Moon,
and the rectennas.
The billboard-like antennae of one LPS base are arranged over
an area of the limb of the Moon so that when viewed from the
Earth they appear to merge into a single, large, synthetic aper-
ture transmitter with a diameter of 30 to I00 kilometers. The
transmitted beams are convergent toward a point well beyond the
Earth. Each beam can be intensity-controlled across its cross-
sectional area to a scale of 200 meters at the Earth. This
allows the LPS to uniformly illuminate rectennas on Earth that
are larger than 200 or 300 meters across.
A given base on the Moon is adequately illuminated only about
half of the days of the lunar month. It is preferable to keep
the lunar bases illuminated and delivering power continuously.
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Large mirrors, "Lunettas," will be placed in orbit about the Moon
and oriented so as to reflect sunlight to the bases. A "Lu-
netta," a version of the solar sail, will have low mass per unit
area, be of low optical quality, and be constructed primarily of
lunar materials.
A station on Earth will receive power directly from the Moon
when the Moon is approximately i0 degrees above its local hori-
zon. To provide continuous power to rectennas that are blocked
by the Earth or attenuated by long paths through the atmosphere,
microwave mirrors in Earth orbit are required. Each microwave
mirror will be approximately 1 kilometer in diameter and be con-
tinuously oriented so as to reflect the microwave beam from the
Moon to a rectenna on Earth.
The lunar power system is complex but has the advantages of
enormous power potential, support for both continuous base load
and load following power and global coverage. If developed in
conjunction with a lunar base, it could supply power to the lunar
base as a means of starting the commercialization process.
Commercial Potent_l - In evaluating the commercial potential
of a concept, industry considers many factors including degree of
risk, payout period, potential market, technical feasibility, R&D
investment requirements and competition of alternative methods.
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If these criteria are applied to the end-stages of the He- 3 fu-
sion project or other extraterrestrial concepts at this state of
their early development, it is not surprising that industry will
not invest now in these concepts when compared to other financial
opportunities. But the same conclusion was understandably
reached about nuclear fission at a similar stage in its develop-
ment.
Commercialization of new concepts takes the combined efforts
of government and industry. The Task Force believes a similar
approach is possible and should be considered in exploring means
to develop long-range, terrestrial electricity supply using ex-
traterrestrial resources, principally the Moon. The Japanese
government/industry approach, embodied in MITI, has been success-
ful in providing Japan with the means of gaining leadership in
many high technology undertakings. This approach should be
considered by the U.S. Government and industry in developing
extraterrestrial energy supply.
The Task Force also firmly believes that complete government
assumption of total project responsibility would inhibit the ad-
Vantages of commercial involvement. Furthermore, a development
program that will evolve over a longtime horizon (50 years) is
outside the time horizon normally considered even by very innova-
tive industries and corporations, although it is comparable to
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the perspective of some natural resource industries. Yet, ex-
traterrestrial energy projects require such a long-term outlook.
Hence, there is an intrinsic need for an innovative approach to
the industry and government cooperation. In addition, the long-
time horizon (50 years) makes it very questionable to use stand-
ard tools of quantitative economic and econometric analysis
(prices, technologies, demand, etc.), since they shift signifi-
cantly and in unpredictable ways.
With these project characteristics and requirements in mind,
the Task Force, during the course of its deliberations, discussed
the proposed Lunar Outpost, which was briefly described in the
NASA Office of Exploration 1988 Annual Report to the NASA Admini-
strator. The review indicated some coincidence between the Lunar
Outpost development time scale and those of the He- 3 fusion
project and the other extraterrestrial energy projects. This is
shown on the chart on the following page.
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The coincidence demonstrated on the chart on the preceding
page suggested a possible innovative, government/industry co-
operative approach to developing and eventually utilizing ex-
traterrestrial resources to help meet terrestrial energy needs.
This approach -- and there probably are others which further de-
tailed analyses by financial experts might suggest -- is based on
the conviction that the commercial development of extrater-
restrial energy and the development of a lunar base can be linked
effectively. The lunar base can serve as a development step of
many of the technologies needed for the energy system, and can be
a customer for services at pilot production levels.
The three options considered in varying degrees by the Task
Force (He- 3, LPS, SPS) differ significantly in both the ser-
vices and side products each may offer for the Lunar Base de-
ployment and subsequent expansion. Solar power technologies can
be designed to provide early power services for Lunar Base oper-
ations, as well as efficient lunar-Earth transportation. He- 3,
per se, could provide power only at some distant future time.
However, power sources needed for mining, beneficiation, and pro-
cessing also could provide early power services to a Lunar Base.
On the other hand, He- 3 mining operations can provide very large
amounts of significant side products (H2, 02, C, AI, Si, etc.)
for lunar and space operations.
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Based on these observations, the following opportunity for
industry and government cooperation might be considered:
An industry consortium and NASA could enter into a joint
development effort for providing energy/utility services
to the Lunar Base, with a view to have early industry
involvement also in the RDT&E of any of the three (and
potentially other) lunar-based energy options.
To accomplish this arrangement, innovative legal and
statutory forms of long-term cooperation between in-
dustry and NASA would have to be explored, ranging from
a long-term service contract for providing these ser-
vices (energy supplies to the Lunar Base and later pro-
duction of energy for use on Earth and in Space), com-
bined with possible co-funding of RDT&E on critical
technology components, to rights of first refusal to any
intellectual and patent rights developed as a result of
this development effort.
In addition, the opportunity for industry involvement
would be improved with a streamlining of government
supervision, regulation, duplication of administrative
and accounting functions. The consortium should be en-
trusted with the procurement of necessary technology
components, and the examination of options and alterna-
tives within each of the key technologies.*
The precedent set in the development of commercial space com-
munications by the COMSATAct may be followed.
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0An important key to lowering the public cost to this en-
terprise would be the granting of mining concessions and
rights to the extracted resources to the consortium.
Innovative international legal precedents also may have
to be established.
The By-Laws of the consortium would provide for a
"plowback" of part of the revenues from the sale of ser-
vice to NASA and technology advances to benefit the en-
terprise effort.
Assuming that such a consortium could be formed to the satis-
faction of both industry and government, broad service goals and
a scenario for such a consortium over the next 50 years might
comprise the following:
Phase I: Initial Lunar Outpost.
He- 3 experimental mining to provide materials to the Outpost
and support fusion experiments on Earth - A 5-_ Satellite
Power System Prototype for solar electric propulsion and for
energy supply to the initial Lunar Base from one of the
libration points. NASA would enter into a services contract
with the consortium for use of the plant(s), as well as
participate in the funding of the RDT&E. Technology
components for large-scale power systems, such as
space-to-earth energy transmission links and fusion reactors,
would be developed in this phase.
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Phase II: Lunar Base.
Continued supply of utilities to the expanding Lunar Base -
Large-scale mining begins leading to the development of a
50-MW power plant either on the moon or at the libration
point(s) for laying the "energy base" for substantially ex-
panded Lunar Base operations. The He- 3 extraction proto-
type process is developed and tested end-to-end. Prototypes
of the key technology components would be tested "in-situ" at
the Base. The knowledge base (technology, costs, risks) of
each of the three options could be established for large-
scale prototype developments.
Phase III: Large-scale Prototype(s).
This phase will see the deployment of one or more of the
three energy options at a scale of several Gigawatts to tens
of Gigawatts.
Phase IV: Operations for Commercial Use on Earth.
Operations of the first power system and expension of capac-
ity to meet global energy needs - This would be the ultimate
goal of the Lunar Enterprise (i.e., the consortium). Impor-
tant contributions simultaneously made to the supply of en-
ergy and material needs in Space for expanded Space explora-
tion and applications.
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CONCLUSIONS
The fundamental conclusion of the Task Force is that the Moon
must play a role in long-term terrestrial electricity supply
matters. The Task Force also believes that early commercial in-
volvement in this task is of paramount importance in achieving
this objective and that a meaningful leadership role for industry
is potentially possible. But it recognizes that total industry
responsibility for projects of this financial magnitude is not
initially possible and government involvement through subsidies
or other means, such as co-funding or enabling contracts, is
vital.
The primary focus for this study, namely the mining of He- 3
for transportation to Earth, is a potentially viable economic
concept but understandably on a long-range schedule and subject
to the establishment of specific conditions, including:
Required space/lunar infrastructure to be put in
place with preponderant government financing.
Involvement of the private sector in defining and
developing this infrastructure.
Development of a private sector/government rela-
tionship that will provide for early private sector
involvement which, as stated above, would not be
possible under traditional financial and commercial
considerations.
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Close coordination between NASA and DOE in the de-
velopment of a commercial fusion reactor to utilize
the lunar He-3 fuel.
The Task Force also reviewed the two solar power concepts,
SPS and LPS. On the basis of information provided to the Task
Force, these concepts likewise could have long-range economic po-
tential as extraterrestrial electric power sources. The Task
Force, however, was not in a position to rate the three concepts
in terms of potential economic viability. But it did conclude
that each concept has both promise and problems.
A great amount of technical information about all three con-
cepts was developed by, and for the Task Force but more remains
to be accomplished to assure confidence in the potential techni-
cal feasibility of the systems; much more detailed information
concerning cost and scheduling must be developed to provide eco-
nomic input; and commercial schemes must be developed in some de-
tail to achieve realistic private sector involvement. To this
end, we would recommend that NASA and DOE expand its work with
academia, industry, and the financial community to further de-
v_lop the technical, economic and commercial parameters that will
better identify extraterrestrial energy options.
But of equal importance is the development of a clear under-
standing on the part of government and industry, at high levels,
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of the fundamental Task Force conclusion that we must look beyond
Earth for our long-term electricity needs because of potential
damaging ecological impacts with continual major dependence on
fossil fuels for terrestrial energy needs. This is a revolu-
tionary concept, and is based on a crucial observation regarding
10ng-term environmental consequences of our current energy pro-
duction options. There must be understanding, agreement and
long-term commitment, and the national will to implement the com-
mitment as a matter of national policy. It also is extremely im-
portant to realize that the concept of extraterrestrial energy
supply is not the responsibility of any single government agency
nor will it seriously be considered if there is not a national
commitment.
Lastly, we must recognize that other nations, notably Japan,
West Germany and Russia, are proceeding with very aggressive pro-
grams to investigate and develop space-oriented, energy systems.
It will be done. It is just a matter of by whom.
REOOMMENDATION
As stated in the conclusions, there is need for, and economic
potential for the use of the Moon's resources in long-term, ter-
restrial electricity supply matters. The factual case for this
finding, however, needs further development. Because of the
long-range nature of these extraterrestrial projects, industry is
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not currently capable or willing to assume financial responsi-
bility for these undertakings. The Task Force, therefore, recom-
mends that NASA and DOE continue to support studies that will
better frame the development of the projects and provide the ad-
ditional technical, economic and financial information that will
be necessary for greater commitments. The Task Force recommends,
however, that these studies not be contracted for under normal
government procedures but rather that industry, the financial
community, and academia be given a primary role in planning the
overall program. This could be accomplished through the estab-
lishment of a high-level private sector advisory committee.
The Task Force also recommends that a Workshop be held in
accordance with its conclusion that national policy on extra-
terrestrial energy supply concepts must be developed. The pur-
pose of the Workshop would be to expose the issue of long-term
energy supply options to high-level decision makers, provide un-
derstanding about the issue, and seek policy direction and com-
mitment. To be successful, the participants must include
high-level representatives of the Administration, appropriate
government agencies such as DOE, EPA and NASA, the energy, envi-
rcr_ent and space leadership of the Congress, electric utilities,
the space and energy supply industries, and the financial
community. Of equal importance, is detailed planning for
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the Workshop. The Task Force recommends that the suggested
private sector advisory committee's participation in the planning
aspects would be essential.
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APPENDIX A
Membership Listing of
Lunar Energy Enterprise C_se Study T_sk Force
Chairman:
John J. Kearney, Senior Vice President (Retired)
Edison Electric Institute
Members:
George V. Butler, Executive Director
Space Station Division
McDonnell Douglas Aeronautics
W. David Carrier, III
Bromwell & Carrier, Inc.
Dr. David Criswell
University of California, San Diego
Dr. Michael B. Duke, Chief
Solar System Exploration Division
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Dr. Harold K. Forsen, Senior Vice President & Manager
Research & Development
Bechtel National, Inc.
Dr. Peter Glaser, Vice President
Arthur D. Little, Inc.
John R. Healy, Manager
Generating Schedule/Cost
Potomac Electric Power Company
Dr. Klaus Heiss
ECDN, Inc.
Mr. Leonard Hyman, First Vice President
Merrill Lynch Capital Markets Group
Dr. Robert Iotti, Vice President
Advanced Technology
EBASCO Services, Inc.
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Members: (Continued)
Dr. Gerald L. Kulcinski
Department of Nuclear Energy
University of Wisconsin
Dr. B. Grant Logan, Deputy Associate Director
University of California
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Dr. Harrison H. Schmitt, Private Consultant
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Jerome Simonoff
Citicorp.
Dr. George C. Vlases
Department of Nuclear Engineering
University of Washington
And Consultant, Spectra Technology, inc.
Gordon R. Woodcock
Boeing Aerospace
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